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Introduction
Few problems have puzzled courts and theorists more than those presented when
parents object to state educational requirements on religious grounds. Parents challenge
the use of course materials,1 the distribution of condoms,2 and attendance requirements
for sexual education courses.3  At the extreme, they seek to cut short their children’s
education4 or avoid enrolling them in school at all.5  On one side of the balance is the
conceded interest of the State in playing some role in shaping children through education.
On the other is the interest in allowing parents to control the upbringing of their children,
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 Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (1987).
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 Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth 420 Mass. 749 (1995).
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 Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Production, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1995).
4
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
5
 Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (1988).
2particularly on matters of religion.  Although they vary on the particulars, most courts
and theorists have agreed that the state intrusions on family control of religious
upbringing should be narrowly limited to those necessary to serve the State’s most central
interests.  This qualified deference seems appropriate in light of the important work
parents do on behalf of their children and the risks inherent in the State’s intrusion on
these efforts.  Where courts and theorists have erred, however, particularly in the cases
involving adolescents, is in their account of the state interests at stake.
Courts and theorists alike have focused nearly exclusively on the substance of the
school curriculum encompassed by the challenged requirements and ignored the
requirements’ effects on the nature of children’s interactions with one another.  They
have asked whether the State has an interest in imparting certain information and skills,
but not whether it has an interest in facilitating certain interactions.  This focus on
substance is striking, in light of its relative lack of importance to adolescent development.
What matters to adolescent development is relationships with their peers, for it is largely
through these relationships that the difficult and important work of identity
formation—the sorting and selecting of values, tastes and talents that will define their
adult selves—will be completed.  The importance of these peer interactions is not lost on
the parents, indeed, it motivates much of their litigation.  But the courts fail to look
beyond the parents’ complaints of burdens imposed by their loss of associational control
to consider what benefits adolescents may derive from these contested interactions.
This article adds this important missing piece to the puzzle.  By drawing on the
literature of child development, it joins a lengthy, thoughtful discussion with some new
information—information that goes to the heart of what is at stake for adolescents in
these parent-state contests for control over their education.  In Part I, I begin by setting
out the state of the law in a range of contexts in which religiously motivated parents
battle the State for educational control.  This discussion of the cases, and the parallel
theoretical analysis of the issues raised, manifests a consistent, narrow focus on the
State’s interest in curricular content, and the lack of consideration of the State’s interest
in facilitating peer interaction.  In Part II, I discuss the developmental literature’s
emphasis on the importance of peer interaction to the adolescent’s identity formation
process, and the relationship of peer and parental influences on a child’s identity
development.  This literature suggests that affording children an opportunity to explore
identity choices through peer interactions will facilitate children’s development of the
capacity for autonomous choice, which many consider central to political participation
and the exercise of rights in our democracy.  In Part III, I consider the implications of this
more sophisticated understanding of adolescent development for the resolution of the
problems posed by the cases.  I conclude that a State interest in fostering the capacity for
independent thought in its children could justify policies encouraging and even, perhaps,
compelling some amount of exposure to unlike peers, and that fears that such policies
might wrest control of religious upbringing from parents can be minimized by limiting
the reach of the policies to the oldest adolescents.
3I.  The Current Discourse
These conflicts between religiously motivated parents and the State present
particularly difficult and important problems for courts and theorists, for they ask the
most basic questions about the role of the State and the parent in determining the fate of
the child.  In this Part, I will demonstrate how the courts and the theorists, in addressing
these questions, have remained remarkably narrow in their focus.  They have framed the
State’s interests in purely curricular terms, entrusting control of the child’s associations to
the parents.
A.  The Cases
In resolving these cases in which parents seek to exempt their children from a
state’s educational requirements by asserting their constitutional right to control their
children’s religious upbringing,6 the courts ask whether the challenged state requirement
burdens genuine religious practice or belief and, if burdensome, whether the requirement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  The test, itself, is relatively
uncontroversial, in large part because it gives no direction about how to evaluate the
burdens and interests in question, leaving resolution to a case-by-case application.
The structure of the test is significant, however, in one respect: It vests the claim
against the State with the parent,7 who is not the intended subject of the State’s
intervention.8  In this sense, the right is exceptional.  It is the right to control another’s
access to state benefits.  While some theorists have taken the position that affording
parents such rights is constitutionally suspect because it protects parents’ interests at the
expense of their children’s,9 the predominant view, which I share, is that considerable
deference to parents on matters of religious upbringing serves children’s interests overall,
and can only be justified if the effects of this deference are at worst neutral for children.10
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 The right to an exemption is asserted under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, and the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has recently explained that it is only the
combination of the religious exercise right with the right of parental control over upbringing that entitles
parents to exemptions  from facially neutral requirements.  See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881-82 (1990).
7
  Many of these cases also assert the free exercise claims of children, but it is the parents’ claims that the
courts address in their decisions.  This is surely due, in part, to the lack of clarity about the nature and
extent of children’s constitutional rights in this area, and the lack of perceived need to resolve this
uncertainty in the context of these cases where the children’s claims mirror those of the parents.  Even if
children are assumed to have rights coextensive with those of adults, however, the Court’s decision in
Smith, supra note , suggests that a religious objection to a State’s facially neutral educational requirement
would not justify an exemption if not accompanied by a claim of a due process right of parental control.
8
 The parent is, however, often the party held responsible for failing to ensure the child’s participation.  See,
e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924) (considering Oregon law requiring parents to send
their children to public school and authorizing fines or imprisonment for failure to do so); Wisconsin v.
Yoder (reviewing constitutionality of convictions of Amish parents for failing to send their children to
school after the eighth grade).
9
 See James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights (1998).
10
 See, e.g., Stephen Gilles, Hey Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 Constitutional Comm. 149 (1999)
(reviewing Dwyer’s Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights).
4Children are generally perceived as ill-prepared to make good judgments about
their own interests,11 and therefore the law looks for the best surrogates to act on their
behalf.  Parents are thought to be especially well qualified to act in their children’s
interests because they feel a deep emotional attachment to their children and know their
needs well.12  The State, in contrast, seems an especially poor candidate to act on
children’s behalf on matters of religious upbringing, both because the establishment
prohibition prevents the State from making such religious judgments and because it lacks
any child-specific expertise.  Although the test tips the balance heavily toward the parent
to reflect the importance of the parent’s work and the threat to its accomplishment posed
by state interference, it does not resolve all claims for the parent.  The compelling state
interest inquiry recognizes that it is appropriate to consider what lies on the other side of
the balance, to consider what benefits the state requirement offers, both for the children
whose parents are challenging it and for society as a whole.13
The test can therefore best be read to establish a means of balancing the claims of
two surrogates, each asserting authority to act on the child’s behalf.14  In determining
whether a parent is entitled to an exemption, the court is, indirectly, deciding whether the
child will be at least as well off under the control of the parent surrogate.  The assessment
is indirect because a primary effect of the parental rights conception of the protection is
to take away from the courts the authority to make case-specific inquiries about whether
the parent is making the best possible choices for her child.  The courts cannot, however,
eschew the more generalized question of the extent to which the value of deferring to
parents for this sort of decision-making is counterbalanced by state educational interests.
Where the right at stake is grounded in a conception of children’s interests and the
countervailing interests of the State are focused on the same children, any “balancing”
                                                                     
    To say that vesting the right to control the religious upbringing in parents serves children’s interests is
not to say that these are the only interests served by this rights allocation.  In asserting this right of control,
parents clearly also serve their own interests, Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209 (noting that the “Amish believed that
by sending their children to high school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the
censure of the church community, but … also endanger their own salvation and that of their children”); and
the interests of their religious community, id. at 212 (referring to expert testimony suggesting that sending
children to high school would jeopardize the “continued survival of Amish communities as they exist in the
Untied States today”).  However, neither of these interests, in my view, would be sufficient to justify
vesting control of the child in the parent if these interests were believed to run counter to the child’s own
interests.
11
 Whether they are  in fact ill-prepared to identify their own interests, and, if so, at what ages and under
what circumstances, is an important, underdiscussed issue that exceeds the scope of this article.
12Cf. William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 447 (“The municipal laws in all well-
regulated states have taken care to enforce this duty [to support one’s children] though Providence has done
it more effectually than any laws, by implanting in the breast that natural … insuperable degree of
affection, which not even … the wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children can totally suppress or
extinguish”).
13
 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 168 (1944) (‘the family itself is not beyond regulation in the
public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. … Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating
or prohibiting the chid’s labor and in many other ways”).
14
 The State, of course, also acts on behalf of other citizens.  My focus in this article, however, is the extent
to which the State can take action on behalf of the very child whose parents oppose that action.
5going on in the resolution of the case amounts in large part to the balancing of one sort of
interest of the child against another.
In the end, the test provides courts with no assistance in determining how to
ascertain whether a state has a strong enough interest to overcome the traditional
deference shown to parents.  This assessment of the nature and strength of the state
interests at stake is left to the courts, in their application of the test to the specific cases
before them.  In my discussion of some of these specific cases, which follows, I will
argue that the courts’ assessments have been consistently deficient in their failure to
consider the core of the adolescent experience, and therefore a primary potential
mechanism of state influence.  In focusing exclusively on the substance of the school
curricula in question, the courts take inadequate account of the State’s interest in
facilitating interactions with peers.
1.  Pierce v. Society of Sisters
In 1925, the Court held in Pierce v. Society of Sisters15 that a state could not
require all children to attend public (rather than private) schools.16  Although it was
brought by two corporations that run schools whose economic survival was threatened by
the law, the case now stands as one of two pillars17 upholding the well-recognized due
process right of parents to “direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”18  Declaring that “those who nurture and direct [a child’s] destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations,” the
Court hinted at the benefit to children that flows from deferring to parental control.19
While the particular holding in Pierce is now taken for granted, its implications
are tremendous.  Whatever the state can do to control the content of education,20 the state
cannot control with whom children are educated.  Parents are given authority over their
children’s school associations, particularly along ideological lines, 21 and may prevent
them from reaping the benefits that might come from mixing with unlike peers.  Pierce
was decided on due process rather than free exercise grounds.  As subsequent cases have
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 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
16
 The Oregon statute in question made it a misdemeanor, subject to fines or imprisonment, for a parent to
fail to send his children to public school between the ages of 8 and 16.  268 U.S. at 530.
17
 The other pillar, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), was pressed, on due process grounds, by a
teacher who was convicted for teaching German to a ten-year-old child, in violation of Nebraska’s
prohibition of the teaching of foreign languages to children in the first eight grades of school.
18
 268 U.S. at 534.
19
 But see “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 William and Mary
Law Rev. 995, 1112-13 (1992) (arguing that the conception of parental rights enshrined in Meyer and
Pierce “had a strong property component”).
20
 Two years after the Pierce decision, the Court made clear that this authority over content was also
circumscribed by the Constitution.  Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
21
 In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld  Congress’s authority, under § 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment, to outlaw racial discrimination in private school admissions.  As in Pierce,
no free exercise claims were pressed in Runyon.
6made clear, however, the protections afforded to parents under the due process clause are
only strengthened in the context of free exercise claims.
2.  Wisconsin v. Yoder
The case most clearly establishing this principle, and most influencing courts’
analysis of parent’s religiously based challenges to state educational requirements, is
Wisconsin v. Yoder, which upheld the right of Amish parents to remove their children
from school two years shy of the period mandated by Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance
law.  Here the parents were explicit in seeking, among other things, to prevent contact
between their children and non-Amish peers.22  Unlike in grade school, where children
attended local Amish schools, or local public schools whose students were predominantly
Amish,23 requiring high school attendance would have forced the Amish children to learn
alongside significant numbers of non-Amish peers.  Forcing this exposure against a
parents’ wishes, the Court concluded, would impose a significant burden on the parents’
exercise of their religion through the control the religious upbringing of their children.
 In considering what state interests lay on the other side of the constitutional
balance, however, the Court took no account of the potential value Amish students might
derive from interactions with non-Amish peers in high school.  Instead, the Court
engaged in a relatively hollow inquiry that appears to be about curricular content:  The
Court’s emphasis on the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic already secured in
grades 1-8, the incremental nature of any value added by the two additional years,24 and
the comparative advantage of the hands-on vocational skills training offered by the
Amish, all suggest that the Court was thinking only about the usefulness of the substance
of a high school education.  Even this curricular assessment was shaped by the Court’s
deference to the parents’ associational choices.  Because parents intended that these
children would grow up to be part of an Amish community, the Court reasoned, the two
additional years of study, while surely important for other children,25 were unnecessary
for the Amish children.
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  406 U.S. at 211 (noting that “[f]ormal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to
Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs … and
with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them
away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period
of life”).
23
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217.
24
 This point, and its content-focused grounding, is expressed more clearly in Justice White’s concurrence,
in which he notes the appropriateness of a state’s setting substantive educational standards and explains that
the exemption requested is appropriate “[s]ince the Amish children are permitted to acquire the basic tools
of literacy to survive in modern society by attending grades one through eight and since the deviation from
the State’s compulsory-education is relatively slight.”  406 U.S. at 238.
25
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (“It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or
two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in
modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the
preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish
faith.”).
7The two, related, themes found in Yoder re-appear throughout the cases in this
area:  (1) Court’s afford tremendous deference to parent’s choices about their children’s
current and future associations and (2) courts limit their consideration of potential
countervailing state interests to curricular (rather than associational) concerns.  Before
considering the developmental implications of this analysis, I will review some of the
contexts in which these themes appear.
3.  Home Schooling
Parents who seek to educate their children at home are generally seeking control
over both the substance of their children’s education26 and their children’s peer
interactions.27 Litigation arises when a state educational requirement imposes limitations
on the parents’ authority to home school, or requires reporting or assessment viewed as
threatening to the parent’s authority.28  In the past, states commonly had statutes that
made it difficult or impossible29 for parents to educate their children at home, and in at
least one case, a court justified interpreting an ambiguous compulsory attendance law to
exclude home schooling by pointing to the importance, to child development, of peer
interaction.30  More recently, courts and legislatures have significantly eased the relevant
requirements, opening the door to a burgeoning home schooling movement.31
In analyzing the State’s interests in regulating home schooling, the courts now
focus exclusively on substantive issues: The courts uphold mandatory achievement tests
because these tests allow the State to assess whether children are learning sufficient
                                
26
 See, e.g., Duro v. D.A./2d Judicial District, 712 F.2d 96 (1983) (listing, among reasons for home
schooling, the parents’ desire to protect children from secular humanist teachings and to eschew medical
treatment).
27
 See, e.g., State v. Patzer, 382 N.W. 2d 631 (1986) (noting that the parents’ desire to home school was
tied, in part, to their fear of negative peer influences which would prevent their children from acquiring the
right religious values and achieving salvation); Duro v. D.A./2d Judicial District, 712 F.2d 96 (1983)
(listing, among the reasons for home schooling, the parents’ desire to shield their children from exposure to
different religious beliefs and corrupting influences).
28
 Those motivated by religious beliefs to home school frequently contend that their God has directed them
to take full responsibility for their children’s upbringing, See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039
(1988) (parents believed they were required by scriptures to exercise complete control over their children’s
education); and that any exercise of state supervisory authority over their children’s education therefore
amounts to a usurpation of divine authority. See, e.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485
(1987) (parents believed that even the state’s reporting requirements compromised the “headship of
Christ”); People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266 (1993) (parents believed that submitting to the state’s
authority, rather than God’s, on matters of their children’s education was a sin).
29
 State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374 (1983) (concluding that a statute that expressly prohibits home
schooling by excluding such arrangements from the list of permissible private schooling arrangements did
not violate the equal protection clause).
30
 Knox v. O’Brien, 72 A.2d 389 (1950) (concluding that home schooling did not provide the required
“equivalent” education as the public schools because it did not offer the same opportunities for social
interaction but rather “cloister[ed] and shelter[ed] children); cf. State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374 (1983)
(concluding, in a case not addressing religious claims, that the state has a legitimate interest in exposing
children to other “attitudes, values, morals, life-styles and intellectual abilities”).
31
 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1998 (noting that estimates of the number of home-schooled children range
from 500,000 to 1.5 million, and stating that numbers have tripled in the past decade).
8information and skills.32  “Equivalency” requirements are also found appropriate,
interpreted as they now are, to assess curricular rather than interactive equivalence.33
Teacher certification requirements get a more mixed reception,34 because they are not as
clearly tied to the substance of the curriculum.  Courts that strike down certification
requirements point to the lack of clear linkage between certification and the quality of
teaching, and courts that have upheld them point to the specialized training and
experience in teaching they reflect.  The general message from the courts is that parents
have a right to control their children’s associations by keeping them out of school, so
long as they ensure that they learn the information and skills required to function in
society as adults.
As significant as the courts decisions on home schooling are the legislative trends.
Increasingly, states are abandoning educational requirements such as certification that
make it difficult or impossible for parents to home school their children. 35  Increasingly,
regulations are crafted to serve the limited purpose of ensuring that children acquire the
basic knowledge and academic skills offered in school.36  Increasingly, states are enacting
provisions which expressly recognize parents’ right to home school, 37 so long as they
provide an “equivalent education,” or teach for an equivalent period of time.38  Where
                                
32
 See Murphy v. Arkansas, 825 F.2d 1039 (1988); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504
N.E.2d 592 (1986)(noting that the superintendent, in overseeing home schooling program, may require
standardized testing to ensure “educational progress and the attainment of minimum standards”).
33
 See, e.g., Blount v. Department of Educational and Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (D. Me. 1988)
(finding that the requirement that a home schooling program be pre-assessed to ensure that it provided an
“equivalent education,” was the least restrictive means of meeting the State’s compelling interest in
ensuring that children received a quality education); see also Battles v. Anne Arundel County, 904 F.Supp.
471 (D. Md. 1995) (upholding a requirement for State monitoring of the content of home schooling
programs); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. at 601-602 (noting that the superintendent, in
assessing whether a home schooling program is “equal ‘in thoroughness and efficiency,’” should focus on
“the proposed curriculum and the number of hours of instruction in each of the proposed subjects,” but may
not dictate “the manner in which the subjects will be taught”); Matter of Raymond Falk, 441 N.Y.S.2d 785
(1981) (concluding that state’s Education Law requires no instruction “designed to enhance a student’s
learning experience by the free association with other children in the classroom, on the athletic field or on
the bus,” but rather asks only “whether [the child’s parents] have furnished a substantially equivalent
instruction in 12 specific subject areas as that afforded in the public schools”).
34
 Compare People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266 (1993) (determining that a teacher certification requirement
was unnecessary to meet the state’s legitimate goal of ensuring that children are educated for self-
sufficiency and political participation) with State v. Patzer, 382 N.W. 2d 631 (1986) (determining that a
teacher certification requirement was narrowly tailored to meet the state’s interest in providing children
with an education adequate to prepare them to undertake the responsibilities of citizenship); see also Care
and Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d at 601.
35
 People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich. 266 (1993) (reporting that 20 states have repealed teacher certification
requirements in the past ten years); Jack MacMullan, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Home
Schooling Statutes, 39 Villanova L. Rev. 1309, 1336-37 (reporting that as recently as 1983, roughly half of
the states did not permit home schooling, whereas all states now allow home schooling under certain
circumstances).
36
 Id. at 1347-48 (noting that standardized testing and the review of teaching materials constitute two
primary means of assessing the appropriateness of home schooling).
37
 Id.at 1341 (reporting that 30 states now expressly exempt home schooled children from the compulsory
attendance laws).
38
 Id. 1338 (reporting that 13 states allow an exemption from the compulsory attendance laws for children
receiving an “equivalent education,” and describing equivalency in substantive terms).
9home schooling is permitted, school districts, for their part, sometimes resist parents’
efforts to include their home-schooled children in intra-scholastic athletics.39
Government action in the home schooling context makes plain what is only implicit in
the other contexts I discuss: The states, themselves, frequently define their interests in
narrow, substantive terms.
4.  Specific Curricular Objections
Inspired by the broad protection afforded in Yoder, many parents have sought to
assert some control over their children’s education by asserting free exercise objections to
their children’s exposure to specific ideas,40 texts,41 or activities42 in the public schools.
Unlike in Pierce, Yoder, and the home schooling cases, these parents do not seek to
control with which peers their children interact, and their curricular objections are often
narrowly crafted.43  Despite the relative modesty of their requests, however, courts often
deny these parents’ curriculum-specific challenges.44  Having ceded their authority to
control their children’s associations to the State by sending them to public school, parents
find there is little left of their right to control their children’s education in that setting.
The disparate protection courts afford to curricular and associational objections
plays out in the courts’ analysis of the religious burden imposed in the two contexts.  In
Yoder and the home schooling cases, courts find that requiring the objectionable exposure
would impose serious burdens on the parents’ religious exercise.  In the context of
curricular challenges, in contrast, the courts trivialize the burden associated with the
                                
39
 See, e.g., Bradstreet v. Sobol, 650 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1996) (upholding the school district’s exclusion of a
home-schooled child from an interscholastic sports program against the due process and equal protection
challenges of the child and her mother); Davis v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association, 1995
Mass. Super. LEXIS 791 (enjoining the athletic association and school district from excluding a home-
schooled child from athletic participation); see also . Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 942
F.Supp. 511 (W.D.Okla 1996) (finding that the school district’s refusal to allow a home-schooled child to
attend public school part time did not violate the parents’ free exercise rights).
40
 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Production, Inc., 68 F.3d 511, 516 (1995) (challenging a school’s
requirement that plaintiff children attend an assembly that included crude sexual gestures and remarks).
41
 See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (1987).
42
 See, e.g., Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749 (1995) (challenging condom
distribution in the schools).
43
 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Production, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1995) (challenging the attendance
requirement at a single assembly); Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749 (1995) (seeking
authority only to restrict the access of their children to condoms without their consent).  Note that the
parents’ claims are not always narrowly limited to a request for a child-specific exemption to particular
material.  In some cases, the parents seek to eliminate objectionable material from the curriculum
altogether.  Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (1985) (objecting, on free exercise
grounds, to the inclusion of a book in a high school English program, despite receiving permission to opt
out of the reading and discussion); Smith v. Ricci, 446 A.2d 501 (N.J. 1982) (objecting to a “family-life
education program that included education on human sexuality, despite the fact that parents were allowed
to excuse their children from objectionable parts of the curriculum).
44
 See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (1987); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
Safer Production, 68 F.3d 525 (1995); Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749 (1995).
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objectionable exposure.45  The difference appears to be one of degree: Compelled
exposure to the entire school experience is construed as burdensome, whereas compelled
exposure to only pieces of the curriculum is not. 46   Setting to one side the analytic
problems with this distinction,47  I note here its effect: While not expressed in these terms,
the effect of the courts’ analysis is to find heavy burdens (requiring the State’s interest in
imposing these burdens to be compelling) on religious exercise where the state interferes
with parental control over peer associations and relatively insignificant burdens
(imposing no constitutional constraint on the State) where the State interferes only with
parental control over content.48  Indeed, in the leading case of Mozert v. Hawkins County
Board of Education,49 the Sixth Circuit even suggests that part of the reason exposure to
curricular specifics in public school cannot be said to impose unconstitutional burdens is
that the parents always have the option of removing their children altogether and
educating them in a private religious school or home school setting.50  The message of
these cases is clear: States are to be given broad discretion in fashioning a curriculum that
serves its educational purposes, but the control of children’s associations is left up to their
parents.
                                
45
 See, e.g., Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749, 759 (1995) (noting that mere
offensive exposure is not enough to establish a burden invoking free exercise protection).
46
 In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (1987), the court concedes that in
Yoder, too, the parents’ goal was to protect their children from objectionable exposure, and focuses on this
issue of degree:  “Unlike the plaintiffs in the present case, the parents in Yoder did not want their children
to attend any high school or be exposed to any part of the high school curriculum … [They] attempt[ed] to
shield their children from all worldly influences.”  In contrast, the Mozert parents “want their children to
acquire all the skills required to live in modern society … [but to] have them excused from exposure to
some ideas they find offensive.”  Id. at 1067.
47
 The courts’ analysis in this and other similar cases might be read to suggest a distinction between a sect
whose religion expressly forbids the exposure in question and one that merely forbids certain values and
practices, which might be undermined, indirectly, by exposure to certain ideas.  But such an interpretation
is problematic.  First, it probably does a disservice to parents who object to particular curricular offerings,
who surely feel directed by their faith to shield their children from the troubling influences.  Second, it is a
slippery distinction to maintain here, where the right at issue is the right to control religious upbringing.  In
many faiths, the dictate is to secure the transmission of one’s faith to one’s children.  Precisely how the
parent achieves this end may be left to the parent, but the parent will certainly feel religiously compelled,
even in exercising her discretion, to achieve the religiously mandated end.
 I note that finding that the exposure to specific texts or activities imposed a significant burden on
a parent’s religious exercise would not force courts to allow the requested exemptions. Rather, it would
require the court to consider what lies on the other side of the balancing test—the state’s interest in
maintaining uniformity in the curriculum and exposing all students to the challenged portions.  Arguing
against the exemption would be the disruptive effect that the exemption would cause to the school’s ability
to teach other children and even the child subject to the exemption.  The distraction and time loss
associated with frequent excusals and re-entries, the costs of developing a parallel curriculum, the loss in
opportunities for group learning processes would all be appropriate to consider.
48
 Parents may still be successful in asserting free exercise challenges in the context of public schools,
where the school more directly compels conduct prohibited by the beliefs of the child’s family.  See, e.g.,
Altman v. Bedford Central School District, 45 F. Supp.2d (1999) (finding that school project requiring
students to design and make a Hindu God violated parents’ free exercise rights).
49
 827 F.2d 1058 (1987).
50
 Id. at 1067 (“The plaintiff parents can either send their children to church schools or private schools, as
many of them have done, or teach them at home.”)
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B.  The Theorists
Resolving these parent-state educational disputes, particularly those motivated by
parents’ religious convictions, has become a central focus for theorists interested in
describing the scope of legitimate state authority over individual conduct in a diverse
society.  Many of these “liberal” theorists have addressed Yoder directly, treating it as the
paradigm case in which a community’s pursuit of its distinct conception of the good life
is pitted against the state’s interest in cultivating certain attributes in its citizens.51
Although the theorists often criticize the Court’s analysis, particularly of the state
interests at stake, they ultimately fall into the same trap as the courts in considering how
those state interests are to be achieved.  Like the courts, they focus on the substance of
curricular offerings and ignore the importance of peer interactions.
Liberal theorists have identified a host of state interests implicated by educational
policies, many of which parallel the interests identified by the courts.52  They also focus
considerable attention, however, on an interest largely ignored by the courts--the interest
in fostering children’s ability to act autonomously, to make decisions “for themselves,”53
determined by their particular values and dispositions. 54  Despite their greater ambitions
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 See, e.g.,Richard Arneson and Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A Critique of
Wisconsin v. Yoder, in Democracy’s Place 137 (Ian Shapiro ed. 1996); Gutmann, Democratic Education;
Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 Ethics 557, 558 (1995); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 Ethics 468, 488-89
(1995); Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity and Nationality in the Liberal State
88-92 (1994); William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 Ethics 516, 516 (1995) (noting that his
essay was inspired by his “long-standing interest in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder”); Martha Nussbaum,
The Role of Religion, in Women and Human Development, the Capabilities Approach (expected
publication date: January, 2000).  Others appear to be addressing the case, without naming it.  See, e.g.,
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 199 (1993) (“[v]arious religious sects oppose the culture of the modern
world and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted influences.   A problem now arises about
their children’s education and the requirements the state can impose.”)
52
 See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism 199 (1993) (describing as the legitimate aims of education to
“prepare [children] to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it
should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in
their relations with the rest of society”).
53
 What constitutes an autonomous act is far from easy to define.  As we shall see, the psychological
literature on identity formation focuses on subjective perceptions, and the experience producing those
perceptions, in determining which decisions can be considered a person’s “own.”
54
 Arneson and Shapiro at 156 (describing their position as arguing for “the moral imperative of educating
for autonomy”); Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education at 30 (arguing that “[t]he same principle that
requires a state to grant adults personal and political freedom also commits it to assuring children an
education that makes those freedoms both possible and meaningful in the future.”). To some, this capacity
for autonomy has intrinsic value, for others, the capacity is justified in instrumental terms (autonomous
choice facilitates an individual’s pursuit of the good), Richard Arneson and Ian Shapiro, Democratic
Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in Democracy’s Place (Ian Shapiro,
ed. 1996) (listing this instrumental value as one among three justifications for making the capacity for
autonomous decision making a central aim of education); Gutmann, Democratic Education at 44
(“contending that “a democratic state must aid children in developing the capacity to understand and to
evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and the good society”) and for still others, possession of
the capacity to exercise independent choice is considered a necessary prerequisite to the political
participation expected of citizens in our system of democracy. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism
(suggesting that the state’s championing of autonomous decision-making, grounded on rational
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for state educational influence, however, theorists championing education for autonomy
maintain the courts’ narrow focus on imparting information as the primary, if not the
only, means of exerting educational influence.  Joel Feinberg, in his seminal piece “The
Child’s Right to an Open Future,” is perhaps the most explicit in his single-minded
attention to substance.  Although he calls for the protection of children’s “anticipatory
autonomy rights” through education, he suggests that the means of ensuring that the
fewest possible options are foreclosed is to fill a child with “knowledge and skills that
will help him choose whichever sort of life best fits his natural endowment and matured
disposition,” 55 and with “a great variety of facts and diversified accounts and evaluations
of the myriad human arrangements in the  world and in history.”56
Other theorists focus more specifically on the importance of children’s acquiring
critical reasoning skills in their education for autonomy.  In the words of Richard
Arneson and Ian Shapiro, “[t]he autonomous person is … one who is capable of standing
back from her values and engaging in critical reflection about them and altering her
values to align them with the results of that critical reflection.”57  In the words of Amy
Gutmann, education “makes choice meaningful,” by developing the intellectual skills
necessary to evaluate ways of life different from one’s parents’.”58  As Gutmann’s
statement makes plain, these theorists equate the state’s facilitation of critical reasoning
and self-reflection with skills training:  Schools teach children how to reason, which they
can then apply, outside of the school context, in making choices about how to live their
lives.
It is worth noting that the centrality of autonomy as an educational goal is the
subject of much debate among liberal theorists.  Though the “political liberals” led by
John Rawls eschew the State’s championing of the ideals of autonomy or individuality
over other comprehensive conceptions of the good, they nevertheless call for the State to
protect children’s opportunity to exit from the community of their parents if they so
choose,59 and they, too, rely on the substance of curricular offerings to secure this exit
opportunity.  In the words of Rawls:
                                                                     
deliberation, should be limited to the context of the political realm). Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and
Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 Philosophy and Public Affairs 338-58 (1980).
55
 Feinberg at 134-35.
56
 Feinberg at 139; cf. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case
of God v. John Rawls?, 105 Ethics 468, 487 n.59 (1995) (noting that “knowledge of the diversity that
constitutes our history and the importance of tolerance are clearly among the core civic aims,” and are more
central to the civic mission of schools than science classes).
57
 Arneson and Shapiro at 162.
58
 Gutmann, Democratic Education, at 30.  Note that she does not embrace a pure “”state of individual”
approach—where state control of education is limited to preparing children for independent choice making.
59
 The tension created by the attempt to avoid promoting autonomy, while preserving children’s capacity to
exercise it, is evident throughout discussions of political liberalism.  See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Liberal
Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God vs. John Rawls? 105 Ethics 468, 488
(“While the state has no business promoting broad ideals like personal autonomy, moreover, to allow
Amish parents to withdraw their children from high school could thwart the children’s ability to make
adequately informed decisions about how to live their lives”).   Rawls concedes that, in at least some cases,
“requiring children to understand [his proposed] political conception in these ways is in effect, though not
in intention, to educate them to a comprehensive liberal conception” which embraces autonomy as an ideal.
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Political liberalism …. will ask that children’s education include
such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that,
for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society
and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their continued
membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of
their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist.60
While limiting the state’s role to the provision of basic information may help prevent the
state from intruding upon parents’ control over the development of their children’s
“comprehensive doctrine,”61 it will do so at a big cost in effectiveness.  Giving children
mere information about their right to leave will do little to facilitate their actual capacity
to leave.  Unless the State is committed to facilitating that capacity, the provision of the
information will be little more than a rhetorical gesture.
In fairness to the theorists, I should acknowledge that a few of them have made
brief mention of the value of peer interactions in the educational process.62  Even to the
extent that the interactive value identified in these discussions can be distinguished from
the value of exposure to diverse ideas (a substance-focused value achievable through 
texts as well as personal interactions), that interactive value is not recognized to
include the central direct role the interactions themselves play in the identity formation
process.63 Instead, theorists point to two other values: first, the skill-building value
provided by the opportunity to practice critical reasoning and political deliberation,64 and,
second, the tolerance-teaching value provided by the exposure to different opinions and
their defenses.  While the first of these values at least concedes an indirect influence on
                                                                     
John Rawls, Political Liberalism at 199 (1993); and even William Galston, who argues that the political
liberals do not go far enough in deferring to the educational choices of diverse communities, concludes that
the State has an interest in  preserving individual’s opportunity for “meaningful exit” and that this interest
“brings us back some distance toward policies more typically associated with autonomy concerns.”  105
Ethics 516, 534 (1995).
60
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism 199 (1993).
61
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism xvi (explaining that “Political liberalism assumes that, for political
purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic
regime”).
62
 Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself 114-17 (1997); Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 107
(“However students have been socialized outside of school, there should be room within school for them to
develop the capacity to discuss and defend their political commitments with people who do not share
them”).
63
 Martha Minow comes the closest to addressing the issue.  In Not Only for Myself, she acknowledges the
link between educational choices and identity formation, and she specifically notes that school choices
include choices about peers as well as about curriculum.  Id.  She does not, however, address the
relationship between peer interaction and identity formation, and it is clearly not her aim to consider how
the process of identity formation actually occurs.
64
 Gutmann, Democratic Education at 106 (concluding that “[t]he most relevant result” of a course that
encouraged students to debate political issues among themselves would be “an increase in the ability of
students to reason, collectively and critically, about politics, an ability … essential to democratic
citizenship,” and citing to a study that suggested that students exposed to extensive classroom discussion
“demonstrated better reasoning capacities and more factual knowledge”).
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identity (interaction teaches critical reasoning, critical reasoning is then applied to life
choices) the second is built on an assumption that there will be no such effects.  Learning
toleration suggests a change in attitudes about difference, but not a diminution of the
differences themselves.65
None of these theorists focus on the value of peer interactions for their direct
effect on an individual child’s identity development.  Overlooking the developmental
significance of these interactions is not simply a problem of academic incompleteness.
The theorists’ incomplete account serves to justify policy positions that a better
understanding of adolescent development suggests may disserve these theorists’ own
principles.  Most particularly, the facts and skills focus leads even those most eager to
facilitate children’s achievement of the capacity for autonomy to condone private
religious schools, so long as those schools comply with certain curricular standards.66
Without acknowledging the price,67 they cede to parents control over precisely those peer
interactions that may most influence children’s opportunity to develop the capacity for
independent choice-making.
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 Minow at 126 (suggesting that “integration across varied divides would not eradicate difference, but
instead nurture self-conscious acknowledgement of identities, and the grounds for tolerance itself.  For
tolerance has no occasion to be tested, or strengthened, in the absence of differences that trigger genuine
disagreement”); Gutmann, Democratic Education at 33 (suggesting that exposing children to “ways of life
different from their parents [will lead children to] embrace certain values, such as mutual respect among
persons, that make social diversity both possible and desirable”); Gutmann, Civic Education and Social
Diversity, 105 Ethics 557, 567 n.17 (1995) (citing empirical support for the conclusion that formal
education is correlated with children’s development of tolerance, and that both the content taught and the
pedagogical methods employed, influence how successful attempts to teach tolerance are).
66
 Arneson and Shapiro, Gutmann, Democratic Education at 116  (arguing that “[a] better alternative to
prohibiting private schools would be to devise a system of primary schooling that accommodates private
religious schools on the condition that they, like public schools, teach the common set of democratic
values”); Gutmann, The Importance of Not Establishing Religion draft at 31 (asserting that “[d]emocratic
authority over education also has important limits, which permit religious and irreligious parents alike to
send their children to private schools, which may teach their religion or irreligion in addition to the state
requirements of civic education”);  Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious
Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 Ethics 468, 486 (1995) (“I would concede the right
to opt out of public schooling, but that right should be understood to be conditioned by a public authority to
regulate private schools to insure that civic basics are taught”).  This position echoes  that of  John Stuart
Mill, who contended that the role of education was to maximize a child’s future choices, that
private/parental control of the schools would better serve this end, but that such control must be subject to
the supervision of the state, in the form of public examinations testing a child’s knowledge of  “facts and
positive science exclusively.”  On Liberty, ch. 5, para. 14.
67
 Gutmann does consider whether outlawing private schools could be justified, but her assessment of the
risks posed by parents’ ability to remove their children from public schools focuses on the potential
depletion of resources and academic performance the removal would cause, rather than the diminution of
opportunities for unlike peers to interact.  See Gutmann, Democratic Education at 116.  Indeed, Gutmann
expressly concedes that allowing private schools will facilitate parents’ segregation of their children from
peers who do not share their religious beliefs, but does not consider this problematic, so long as the
children are taught a “common set of democratic values.”  Id. at 117.
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II.  The Developmental Stakes
The courts’ and commentators’ account of the State’s interests in educating
adolescents demonstrates a lack of attention to the core tasks of adolescent development
and how the schools can influence that development.  By early-adolescence, much of the
hard work of cognitive development is behind children.68  What lies ahead, as the
developmental preoccupation of late adolescence and early adulthood, is identity
development.  Adolescents are engaged in the process of figuring out who they
are—particularly how they are like and unlike the models established for them by their
parents—and their relations with peers play a major role in the process.  It is this identity
formation process, and the path it takes through peer interactions, that is most effected by
the courts’ decisions in these cases.  An understanding of this development is therefore
essential to careful law making in this area.
In this part, I will pursue this developmental understanding, first by discussing the
significance of the identity formation process to adolescents, generally, and second by
considering the relative influence of parents and peers on that process.  My discussion of
adolescent identity formation will highlight the value attributed by many
developmentalists to the process of identity exploration, which has been correlated both
with more successful functioning, and with an individual’s greater sense of personal
control over her choices.  The State’s interest in children’s development into healthy and
productive adults and into autonomous participants in the democratic process are
therefore both implicated by policies affecting children’s opportunity to engage in
identity exploration.
How the State might facilitate exploration takes us to our second developmental
topic, namely the influence of parents and peers on the identity formation process.  My
survey of the relevant literature reveals that both parents and peers profoundly affect the
adolescent’s identity development but that their influence operates in significantly
different ways.  Where parents tend to exert the primary influence over the substance of
adolescent’s choices, particularly about the important issues that are our focus here, peers
play a critical role in the process of identity formation.  Peer interactions offer the best
opportunity for exploration, and this opportunity will be considerably enhanced if the
peers with whom the adolescent interacts differ in background and convictions from
herself.  This literature suggests that ceding control over adolescents’ peer associations to
parents could significantly limit the State’s ability to facilitate adolescents’ identity
exploration.
A.  Why Social Science?
My ultimate task, which I will take up in Part III, is to consider how, if at all, a
more sophisticated understanding of child development should change how we analyze
                                
68Doris R. Entwisle, Schools and the Adolescent,  in At the Threshold, The Developing Adolescent (S.
Shirley Feldman and Glen R. Elliott eds. 1993) 197 (asserting that, by adolescence, the pace of cognitive
development has slowed to one tenth of its elementary school pace).
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parents’ attempts to control their children’s education for religious reasons.  Before
digging into the developmental literature, I therefore wish to consider the appropriateness
of this interdisciplinary inquiry.
Put simply, an understanding of development is important because the law
affecting children is grounded on developmental assumptions.69  The law frequently treats
children differently from adults, and this difference in treatment is justified by the
perception that children’s cognition, social skills, moral values and functional
competencies are not fully70 developed.71  Courts and commentators point to children’s
immaturity and related dependency to justify placing control of important decisions on
their behalf in the hands of parents and the state, and to justify the allocation of surrogate
decision-making between parents and the state.72
To say that children’s incomplete development serves to justify their special
treatment under the law is not to say that decisions about how the law should treat
children are well grounded in an understanding of how children actually develop.
Indeed, much of the law affecting children rests on simple assertions that children are
developmentally different, or unsupported assumptions about the nature of those
differences.73  The value of turning to the developmental literature is, therefore, the
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 In analyzing the law as it applies to children, developmental assumptions come into play in two ways that
roughly correlate with discussions of children’s legal rights on the one hand, and children’s needs and
interests, on the other.  In considering the proper scope of children’s right to exercise decision-making
control, the courts make express or implied assumptions about children’s capacities and rely on
assumptions about children’s insufficient development of relevant capacities to justify curtailing children’s
rights.  See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (justifying state imposition of special restrictions on
minors' abortion rights that would be unconstitutional if applied to adult women on the basis of minors’
lesser capacity for decision making and their relationship of dependence on their parents). In this context,
the assumptions are about developmental status, and differences in status serve to justify a diminution in
rights.  In contrast, the developmental assumptions underlying consideration of children’s needs and
interests, such as the educational interests at issue in our cases, go as much to process as to status.  In this
context, the ongoing nature of children’s developmental process justifies special legal rules aimed at
affecting and protecting that process.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (noting the
importance of the state’s educational role in developing children’s capacities to support themselves and
participate in the political process); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (asserting that the State has
an interest in securing “the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies”).
70
 I note that the concept of “full” or complete development is simplistic.  The term “development” is
increasingly used to describe the ongoing process of change over the course of a lifetime, see, e.g., Paul B.
Baltes, Ulman Lindenberger and Ursula M. Staudinger, Life-Span Theory in Developmental Psychology, in
Handbook of Child Psychology (William Damon, ed. 1998), but the legal concept of development draws a
clean line at adulthood.
71
 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (explaining that “[w]e have recognized three reasons
justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:
the peculiar vulnerability of children, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed manner, and
the importance of the parental role in child rearing”).
72
 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1977) (concluding that children’s interests were best served by
refusing to recognize their due process right to an independent hearing prior to a mental health
commitment, instead leaving parents with “plenary authority to seek such care for their children, subject to
a physician’s independent examination and medical judgment”).
73
 For example, compare Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (asserting, without support, that “most
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions,
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simple value of improving the understanding of children that serves as the basis of their
legal treatment.
While simple in its value, the developmental inquiry is far from simple in its
application.  There are many ways in which this social science literature could be misread
or over-read, and a brief consideration of the limitations of this literature will help ensure
its proper use in our inquiry.  In general, objections to the reliance on social science
literature can be roughly divided into two categories—the first focuses on the
indeterminate nature of available information, and the second on the information’s
contextual dependence.  The first category of objections points to the lack of any direct
testing of many of the specific questions the law confronts, the potential methodological
weaknesses of studies, the limitations on the conclusions that can be drawn from even the
best studies, and the inconsistency of results from one study to the next.74  The second
category of objections focuses on sampling issues, and the role context, and particularly
cultural context, plays in shaping how studies are designed, what results are obtained, and
how those results are interpreted.75  We worry about the first category of objections
because they call into question how much we can learn from the professionals about how
any child develops, and we worry about the second category of objections because they
suggest that whatever we can learn from the literature says at least as much about our
culture’s expectations and values as about inherent capacities.
Both categories of objections are important, but neither, in my view, counsels
against giving the developmental literature careful consideration.  While
developmentalists surely do not have all the answers, they are asking important, relevant
questions, and as incomplete and uncertain as their answers are, they are far better
grounded, or more carefully qualified, than the answers guessed at by lawmakers.
Moreover, to the extent the law is premised on developmental assumptions that remain
untested, only a careful consideration of the developmental literature can illuminate these
gaps.
 As for the contextual concerns, while developmentalists’ conclusions will
inevitably reflect the culture in which their studies are conducted, these conclusions will
                                                                     
including their need for medical care or treatment”) with Thomas Grisso and Linda Vierling, Minor’s
Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 Professional Psychology 412, 424 (1978)
(concluding, on the basis of a literature review, that “[t]here appear to be no psychological grounds for
maintaining the general legal assumption that minors at age 15 and above cannot provide competent
consent to treatment”).
74
 See, e.g., Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert E. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis
and Formation, Problems and Prospects, 3 S. Cal. Interdis. L. Rev. 631 (1994) (listing, among other
methodological problems with social science research, problems of measurement, assessing causal linkage
and skewed interpretation by biased researchers).
75
 See, e.g.,  Sally L. Archer, A Feminist’s Approach to Identity Research, in Adolescent Identity Formation
(Gerald Adams, Thomas Gullotta, and Raymond Montemayor, eds. 1992) 26 (citing numerous examples
where the most influential developmentalists relied heavily, if not exclusively, on studies in which the
subjects were white boys from academically and professionally successful families); Martha Fineman and
Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce,
1987 Wisc. L. Rev. 107 (contending that social science research on topics related to custody focuses
disproportionately on fatherhood which has the effect of devaluing mothers’ contributions).
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at least tell us something about developmental possibilities, if not necessities.  As
important, these studies can tell us a great deal about developmental influences.  How
much we as a society choose to value various developmental ends will ultimately be a
moral and political rather than a developmental inquiry, but ascertaining how to achieve
the ends we value will require an understanding of these developmental influences.76
The objections, of course, are not so much to the studies themselves as to their
misuse and manipulation in the hands of their interpreters.77  In light of the seriousness of
this risk, it is worth clarifying the nature of my task  My intention is to stimulate
interdiscplinary discussion, not to provide the final word on children’s development.  I
consider my inquiry from law to development part of an ongoing process of
interdisciplinary work that should run in both directions.  Just as the legal inquiry should
be informed by the current state of developmental knowledge, so should the
developmental inquiry, going forward, take better heed of the legal issues to be resolved,
and the legal context in which development occurs.  A better discussion between the
disciplines should, over time, produce better answers to both methodological concerns,
and the larger issues driving the inquiry.
While the objections I have discussed do not argue against pursuing the
developmental inquiry, they should be put to work to guard against any suggestion that
the answers are clearer than they are.  The value of the inquiry is not that it can simplify
the analysis, but rather that it can facilitate a more intelligent consideration of
complexities.78  The law’s special treatment of children should be developed with as
subtle an understanding as possible about what is known, and what is not, about the
relevant stakes for children of that treatment.  Deciding what should be made of that
understanding is then the hard task of law making.
I have argued that the courts’ analysis in the cases we are considering can best be
understood to reflect an attempt to weigh the relative costs and benefits to children,
generally, of allowing the state to enforce its educational requirements, on the one hand,
or deferring to particular parents’ religiously motivated judgments, on the other.
Although not so articulated, this weighing is, at its core, a developmental inquiry—it
considers who can and should have what influence over how children grow up, and by
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 In looking to the literature for this understanding, we must, of course, take care in distinguishing
correlation from causation.  See Ramsey and Kelly, supra note     at 648.
77
 See, e.g., William Gardner, David Scherer, and Maya Tester, Asserting Scientific Authority, Cognitive
Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 American Psychologist 895 (criticizing the misuse of
developmental theory and data in amicus briefs to argue for the elimination of restrictions on a minor’s
right to an abortion).
78
 Understanding children’s development can lead to more sophisticated lawmaking on several levels:  Most
obviously, to the extent legal rules are grounded exclusively on developmental assumptions, a better
understanding of development will produce better-justified rules and, where assumptions are shown to be
incorrect, better rules.  The developmental inquiry can also have other beneficial analytic effects:  Where
developmental effects point in one direction, but the law in another, the developmental inquiry may help to
illuminate what other considerations are at stake, and what relative weight is being afforded to these
various considerations.  Moreover, the precision required to frame a useful developmental inquiry can help
to clarify the nature and scope of the various interests at stake, whether or not that inquiry produces
definitive social scientific conclusions.
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what means that influence is exercised.  In the next section I will bring the developmental
inquiry to the fore, focusing particularly on adolescence, where the balancing problem
becomes most complex.
B.  The Developing Adolescent
The major developmental work of adolescence in western cultures79 is identity
formation.  A major means by which the work is accomplished is peer interactions.  Who
those peers are, and the nature of those interactions, will inevitably have considerable
effect on who adolescents become.  In light of the evident importance of the choice of
peer associations to children’s development, it is striking how little consideration is
given, by courts and commentators alike, to the associational implications of their
decisions and policies.
In this section I will begin by describing developmentalists’ understanding of the
adolescent process of identity formation, and how it can vary in its path and its endpoints.
After discussing identity formation in general terms, I will consider, more particularly,
adolescents’ development of a religious identity, noting that this development can be
understood to include both the development of a sense of group affiliation and the
development of a sense of personal religious values and commitments.  I will then go on
to consider the influences on the different aspects of identity development, focusing on
the comparative influence of parents and peers.  I will conclude that, while both parents
and peers exert significant influence over the identity formation process, interactions with
parents are central for much of childhood, whereas peer interactions become increasingly
influential in middle and late adolescence.  The difference in the timing of these
interactional influences corresponds to some differences in the nature of the influence.
While parents exert the primary influence over adolescents’ choice of long-term goals
and values and their sense of group affiliation, peers play an important role in influencing
how adolescents engage in and perceive the choice-making process.  How this choice-
making process is experienced, I will argue, may affect the extent to which choices made
can be characterized as autonomous.
1.  Identity Formation
Sorting out our identities is a life-long project.80  Infants discover that they are
distinct from their caregivers and that they can exercise some control over their bodies,
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 While there is a considerable variety in the groups represented in the cases we are addressing, they all
appear to recognize a developmental transition period between childhood and adulthood that spans a
considerable portion of the teenage years.
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 Jane Kroger, Identity in Adolescence, The Balance Between Self and Other 18 (1996) (describing the
Eriksonian view that “identity evolves through earlier stages of development and continues to be reshaped
throughout the life-cycle”).
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and their environment.81  Young children discover what they are good at, what they like
to do, and with whom they like to play.82  But it is in adolescence that the concept of
self—the integrated composite of personality, tastes, values, skills, and behaviors—is
most thoroughly and self-consciously developed.83  This identity formation concentrates
in adolescence in part because of preceding cognitive advancements: By mid-
adolescence, most individuals have developed the capacity to engage in abstract
thinking,84 which allows for a consideration of overarching principles and alternative
hypothetical worlds,85 and the capacity for the coordination of multiple viewpoints, or
“perspectives,”86 which facilitates reflection and self awareness.  The identity formation
process is also inspired, at least in western cultures,87 by what lies ahead: The imminence
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 See Eleanor E. Maccoby, Social Development 251 (1980) (noting that, while the time of discovery
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their own bodies, movements and cries in a single perception of bodily self early in infancy).
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 See William Damon and Daniel Hart, Self-understanding in childhood and adolescence 59 (1988)
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 Carol Markstrom-Adams, A Consideration of Intervening Factors in Adolescent Identity Formation, in
Adolescent Identity Formation 179-80 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta and Raymond Montemayor,
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 Id. (noting that “[a]n inability to examine several possible identity alternatives” circumscribes the identity
formation process).
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 Harold D. Grotevant and Catherine R. Cooper, Individuation in Family Relationships, A Perspective on
Individual Differences in the Development of Identity and Role-Taking Skill in Adolescence, 29 Human
Development 82, 86-87 (1986) (citing Robert Selman, and other developmentalists, for their work
documenting the development of socio-cognitive, perspective-taking skills through adolescence).  The
complexity of the following passage by Erik Erikson captures the sophistication of social cognition
demanded by the identity formation process:
Identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and
observation, a process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the
individual judges himself in the light of what he perceived to be the way in which others
judge him in comparison to themselves and to a typology significant to them; while he
judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceived himself in comparison to
them and to types that have become relevant to him.
 Identity: Youth and Crisis 22 (1968); see also Ray R. Buss and D. Enright, Helping Adolescents Improve
Their Ego-Identity, in Working with Troubled Children 153 (Coleman, ed. 1987) (contending that “social
perspective taking is key to identity formation”).
87
 Note that the very concept of adolescence, let alone the developmental significance of this stage, is
culture-specific.  In many cultures, individuals are expected to take on adult-like roles when they reach
puberty, and whatever developmental work is required to prepare them for these roles will occur earlier in
childhood.  See Mary Ellen Goodman, The Culture of Childhood 3 (noting that there is considerable
variation among cultures in the behavior of adolescents, and attributing that difference to “culturally
patterned expectations, in training, and in social controls”).  While there is considerable variation among
the cultural groups represented in our cases, adolescence in all these cultures is a period during which
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of independence from parents, and the resulting necessity of making important decisions
about work, friendships, lifestyle and family, all focus the adolescent’s attention on her
identity.88  Of course, identity formation continues beyond adolescence (indeed, the very
decisions in question will as much shape as be shaped by an individual’s concept of
identity).  But in no other period will identity formation be as intense or as central.
Erik Erikson was the primary pioneer in the study of identity development, and
his theory of identity formation, first articulated four decades ago, still serves as the
starting point for much contemporary analysis of the subject.  Erikson suggested that a
major shift occurs in adolescence, when the earlier childhood process of “identification,”
(the assumption of the values and roles associated with admired others) is replaced by the
process of identity formation.  During this latter phase, the adolescent selects among
these earlier identifications, embracing some and rejecting others, and in the process
develops and reveals her89 own, integrated set of values and tastes.  Erikson suggested
that this process of identity formation—the development of a “subjective sense of
invigorating sameness and continuity”90—was essential to healthy development.  Facing,
and resolving, the “identity crisis” enabled individuals to make important life choices that
would serve their unique needs and talents, gave them a kind of stability and security that
equipped them to remain faithful to their commitments and handle life’s vicissitudes, and
prepared them to enter relationships of intimacy.91  Put simply, Erikson contended that
how the identity formation process unfolded in adolescence and young adulthood would
have a dramatic effect on the entire life-course of individuals.
                                                                     
individuals prepare for, but do not for the most part yet undertake, adult responsibilities.  This similarity
across these cultures may be, in part, because they are all governed by the same legal structure, which sets
the age of adulthood at 18 for most purposes.
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 Note that the developmental focus on identity need not be equated with a focus on individuality.  In
cultures oriented toward a group rather than individual identity, an adolescent’s identity work may be
heavily focused on discovering her fit within the group.
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 Those familiar with Erikson’s work may take note of my choice of “she” as the generic pronoun.
Erikson’s empirical work focused heavily on males, and when he turned his attention to identity formation
in females, he developed a theory of the “inner space” that has been soundly criticized on the level of both
method and theory.  See, Serena Patterson, Ingrid Sochting, and James Marcia, The Inner Space and
Beyond: Women and Identity, in Adolescent Identity Formation (Gerald Adams, Thomas Gullotta, and
Raymond Montemayor, eds. 1992) (describing Erikson’s “Inner Space” theory, and subsequent studies of
women’s identity development).  I choose the pronoun advisedly, on the view that Erikson’s work that
focused on males is now thought to have broad application to adolescents of both sexes in western cultures.
Cf. David R. Matteson, Exploration and Commitment: Sex Differences and Methodological Problems in the
Use of Identity Status Categories, 6 J. of Youth and Adolescence 353, 354 (1977) (criticizing poor design
of studies ostensibly aimed at capturing differences between man’s and woman’s identity formation
process).
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 Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis 19 (1968).
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 In Erikson’s view, where the identity formation process was most successful, individuals would enter
adulthood with a “sense of psychosocial well-being … a feeling of being at home in one’s body, a sense of
‘knowing where one is going,’ and an inner assuredness of anticipated recognition from those who count.”
Erik Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis 165 (1968); Jane Kroger, Identity in Adolescence, The Balance
Between Self and Other (1996) (setting out the link between identity formation and subsequent
preparedness for intimacy, in Erikson’s 8-stage scheme of crises and resolutions).
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Erikson perceived of the identity-formation process as a considered choice-
making process, and his use of the term “crisis” attempted to capture the necessity of
confronting and making these choices.  Building upon Erikson’s theories, James Marcia
suggested that the identity formation process reflected development along two different
axes—the experience of crisis (doubt and indecision accompanied by an awareness of
multiple competing possibilities) and the undertaking of commitments (resolution of
these doubts and selection among the possibilities)—which, considered together, allowed
for the categorization of all individuals into four identity statuses:  Individuals who had
gone through a crisis period and then undertaken commitments were labeled identity
achieved, or achievements.  Individuals who had confronted the crisis but not yet
undertaken commitments were labeled moratoriums.  Individuals who had undertaken
commitments without ever experiencing the crisis period were labeled foreclosures, and
individuals who had neither experienced crisis nor undertaken commitments were labeled
diffusions.92  Marcia contended, and numerous subsequent studies have confirmed, that
the number of achievements increases with age, as more individuals passed through the
crisis and commitment processes.93
Both Erikson and Marcia concluded that there were more and less healthy ways of
developing an identity.  In Erikson’s terms, the most healthy adults were those who had
confronted and resolved the identity crisis, in Marcia’s, the healthiest adults were identity
achieved.94  Like Erikson, Marcia placed particular emphasis on the value of the crisis
experience, suggesting that through this experience individuals acquired an understanding
of self that equipped them to make decisions driven by genuine personal preference
rather than externally imposed obligations and expectations.  In contrast, individuals who
resolved their identity issues without questioning and experimentation were likely to be
inflexible, conventional, and authoritarian adults.95  The identity work of moratoriums
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 James E. Marcia,  Development and Validation of Ego Identity Status, 3 J. or Personality and Social
Psychology 551 (1966).
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 Jane Kroger, Identity in Adolescence, The Balance Between Self and Other 39 (1996) (citing longitudinal
studies showing a progression from non-crisis statuses of foreclosure and diffusion to the mid and post-
crisis statuses of achievement and moratorium); Wim Meeus and Maja Dekovie, IdentityDevelopment,
Parental and Peer Support in Adolescence: Results of a National Dutch Survey, 30 Adolescence 931
(1995) (citing studies showing “a consistent increase in commitment and exploration by age); A.
Waterman, Developmental Perspectives on Identity Formation: From Adolescence to Adulthood, in Ego
Identity: A Handbook for Psychosocial Research (J. E Marcia, et. al., eds. 1993) (finding that the number of
achievements increases with age and that the number of foreclosures, and especially diffusions, decreases
with age).
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 See Jane Kroger, Identity in Adolescence, The Balance Between Self and Other 36 (1996) (summarizing
Marcia’s findings that achievements showed “flexible strength,” and openness); Alan S. Waterman,
Optimal Psychological Functioning, in Adolescent Identity Formation 56 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P.
Gullotta and Raymond Montemayor, eds. 1992) (noting that, for identity statuses other than identity
achieved, there were both healthy and pathological aspects and that, even some subset of those with
achieved status completed the process prematurely); (Bersonsky, , in Adolescent Identity Formation 194
(arguing that achievements and moratoriums are more prepared to adapt to life’s vicissitudes because, they,
unlike foreclosures or diffusions, engage in an information-oriented process of decision-making).
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 Michael D. Berzonsky, , in Adolescent Identity Formation 197 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta
and Raymond Montemayor, eds. 1992) (contending that foreclosures possess rigid belief systems, are
intolerant of ambiguity, resist dissonant information, and have difficulty evaluating or integrating
information from multiple perspectives); Jane Kroger, Identity in Adolescence, The Balance Between Self
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was perceived as incomplete,96 but they were expected to eventually advance to the status
of achievement, whereas foreclosures were perceived as potentially locked in to a
deficient identity resolution that stifled their ability to engage in autonomous action.97
Although the term “crisis” has gradually been replaced by the term “exploration”98—to
capture the relevant process and to emphasize the developmental normality and
appropriateness of the experience—Erikson’s and Marcia’s theories are still extremely
influential.99
Many subsequent studies have supported the correlation between identity
exploration and subsequent successful functioning, and some have tied this successful
functioning to an increased perception of personal control over choices made.100   Others,
however, have emphasized that the value of this process of exploration is largely context
                                                                     
and Other 37 (1996) (summarizing Marcia’s findings that foreclosures tended to be rigid, defensive,
approval-seeking, and authoritarian); cf. Gerald R. Adams, Introduction, in Adolescent Identity Formation
1-2 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta and Raymond Montemayor, eds. 1992); Cf. Waterman in
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 Wim Meeus, Toward a Psychosocial Analysis of Adolescent Identity: An Evaluation of the Epigenetic
Theory(Erikson) and the Identity Status Model (Marcia), in Social Problems and Social Contexts in
Adolescence (Klaus Hurrelmann & Stephen F. Hamilton, eds. 1996) (noting that individuals with a
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Waterman in Adolescent Identity Formation 64 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta and Raymond
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29 Human Development 82 , 86(1986) (suggesting that “exploration more accurately captures the typical
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 See Michael D. Berzonsky, A Process Perspective on Identity and Stress Management, in  Adolescent
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Results of a National Dutch Survey, 30 Adolescence 931, 932 (1995) (summarizing literature associating
identity achievement and moratorium with positive characteristics, including high levels of self-esteem,
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those characteristics); Cf. Alan S. Waterman, Identity as an Aspect of Optimal Psychological Functioning,
in Adolescent Identity Formation 62-65 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta and Raymond
Montemayor, eds. 1992) (reporting study results suggesting that, overall, achievements function at the
highest level, but that foreclosures also show high self-esteem, clear goal setting and low levels of anxiety).
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dependent: How being afforded this opportunity to explore affects a child will surely
depend, at least in part, on whether that child grows up in, and is expected to remain
within, a culture that anticipates the opportunity for making choices.101  The more
narrowly circumscribed those choices, the more potentially meaningless, even
destructive, a process of exploration might be.  Of course, the extent to which it is
appropriate for the state to influence a child’s very cultural context (by, for example,
increasing the child’s opportunity to exercise choice) lies at the heart of any consideration
of how to allocate educational control between parent and state.
A consideration of the value we might want to place on giving an adolescent an
opportunity to engage in extensive identity exploration requires us to address several
interrelated empirical and normative questions: To what extent will the process of
exploration lead individuals to make a broader range of choices, even if they have grown
up in communities where such choices are discouraged?  To what extent will the process
of exploration change how children see themselves and how they function in such
communities, should they decide to stay?  How highly should we value a child’s
identification with the religious beliefs and practices of her parents, and why?  And
finally, how highly should we value the exploration process itself and the choices that
grow out of such exploration, and why? In this Part, I focus on the empirics, in the next I
will take up the normative questions.
Of particular interest for our inquiry is how children develop a religious identity
and how that particular aspect of identity formation interrelates with identity formation as
a whole.  After briefly considering what is encompassed within the concept of a religious
identity, I will turn to an examination of two important influences over the progress of
identity development—parents and peers.
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 Cf. Harold D. Grotevant & Catherine R. Cooper, The Role of Family Experience in Career Exploration:
A Life-Span Perspective, in Life-Span Development and Behavior 242 (Paul Baltes, David L. Featherman,
and Richard M. Lerner, eds. 1988) (noting that the value of the identity exploration process depends upon
cultural norms and that the equation of family health with adolescent exploration “is most prevalent in
societies in which high value is placed on individuals’ opportunities to have control over choices that affect
their lives.”); Harold D. Grotevant and Catherine R. Cooper, Individuation in Family Relationships, A
Perspective on Individual Differences in the Development of Identity and Role-Taking Skill in Adolescence,
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Consideration of Intervening Factors in Adolescent Identity Formation, in Adolescent Identity Formation
147 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta and Raymond Montemayor, eds. 1992) (reporting studies
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Bersonsky, in Adolescent Identity Formation 194 (Gerald R. Adams, Thomas P. Gullotta and Raymond
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maturity reflects a cultural bias in developmental psychology); Jane Kroger, Identity in Adolescence, The
Balance Between Self and Other  31, 33 (1996) (discussing Erikson’s critics, generally, and the potential
cultural limitations of his identity crisis theory).
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a.  Religious Identity Formation
The development of a sense of religious identity is an important piece of the
adolescent’s larger identity formation process.102  Going as it does to the core of one’s
beliefs, values, practices and affiliations, sorting out one’s own religious identity from
that of one’s parents is as important as any other sorting that occurs in the identity
formation process.  This sorting may be especially important because it is in the area of
religion that parents generally care the most about reproducing their identities in their
children.103  If the language of “crisis” is ever appropriate, it may be here, where the
prospect of a child’s embracing a religious identity that diverges from that of her parents
is likely to be considered especially significant to parent and child alike.
While the identity choices made in this area may be of particular importance, the
process of forming a religious identity looks much like the identity formation process in
other domains, and the developmentalist is interested in the same questions: What, if any,
commitments has the adolescent made?  Through what process did the adolescent make
those commitments?  What correlations can we draw between the answers to these
questions and indicators of well being?  Numerous studies of adults suggest that the
possession of religious convictions and affiliations correlates with positive health and
mental health outcomes.104  As in other areas of identity formation, however, many
developmentalists have concluded that the process leading to commitment matters more
than the ultimate commitments made.105
An adolescent may embrace religious beliefs with or without first passing through
a period of critical exploration. People can be “foreclosed” in their religious
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 Elizabeth Weiss Ozorak, Social and Cognitive Influences on the Development of Religious Beliefs and
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Religion: A Developmental Approach, 43 Sociological Analysis 131 (1982) (describing adolescence as a
“critical stage” in the development of religious commitment).
103
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 See, e.g., A.E. Bergin, Values and Religious Issues in Psychotherapy and Mental Health, 46 American
Psychologist 394 (1991).
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commitments, just as in other areas of commitment.106  In this context, as in others,
psychologists have found indications that those who embrace religion out of an
unreflective sense of obligation to achieve approval or to avoid feelings of guilt, manifest
more negative mental health outcomes than do those who experience their embrace of
those beliefs as a volitional, self-determined act that has been assimilated into an
integrated sense of self.107
In addition to this belief-focused aspect of religious identity, there is also an
affiliation-focused aspect of religious identity that can best be viewed as a form of ethnic
identity.108  The strength of this affiliation-based identity will vary considerably among
religions, but it is worth noting, albeit somewhat tautologically, that this group
identification is likely to be particularly strong in religious groups who hold themselves
apart from the rest of society.  Appreciating the distinction between the belief-based
conception of religious identity and the affiliation-based conception is important, because
the developmental course of these two aspects of identity formation does not appear to be
identical.
Belief-based religious identity-formation largely awaits adolescence,109 and for
many continues well beyond adolescence.110  This is, as with other aspects of identity
formation going to important values,111 in part because it requires the late-developing
ability to think abstractly and in part because it is in adolescence that important life
choices that will be driven by an individuals values and tastes begin to loom large. 112   In
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contrast, there is evidence to suggest that affiliation-based identity formation starts much
earlier in childhood.113  This affiliation-based spiritual identity may be fairly firmly
established by mid-adolescence, when many embrace their religious affiliation through
some form of ceremony, such as a confirmation ceremony or a bar or bas mitzvah.
Clearly a child’s early sense of affiliation will have some effect on her subsequent
development of a belief-based identity, and her development of her belief-based identity
will affect her sense of affiliations. To explore the nature of these effects I turn to a
consideration of the connection between association and identity.
2.  The Influence of others on Identity Formation
a.  The Role of Parents
Children’s earliest conceptions of themselves are heavily entangled with their
conceptions of their primary caretakers, most commonly their parents.  Early perceptions
of self are dominated by parental influences not simply because of the disproportionate
amount of time spent together, but also because of the particular nature of the relationship
between parent and child.  The child begins life abjectly dependent on her parents to meet
her most basic physical and emotional needs, and the parents meet their responsibilities
by asserting considerable authority over the child.  Childhood perceptions of self reflect a
heavy identification with parents’ beliefs, values and tastes,114 and a conception of
morality driven by what will inspire parental approval and disapproval.115
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This conception of self can be viewed as highly adaptive while children remain in
a condition of dependence, but it must be altered, at least to some degree, before an
individual can leave the household of her parents and assume adult responsibilities.  It is
important to emphasize that this process of “individuation” does not require a child to
reject her parents or their values.  Indeed, a close parent-child relationship has been found
to facilitate, rather than impede, the individuation process.116  Through individuation, the
adolescent discovers herself as a person distinct from her parents, but, in doing so, she
may very well embrace the choices of her parents.
In considering the nature of the individuation process it is, again, impossible to
divorce development from context. While some of the drive to form an identity separate
from one’s parents’ is thought to come from cognitive and biological changes, this
process of individuation is also inspired by societal expectations.117  In all the cultural
contexts considered in our cases, children are expected to remain dependent upon, and
under the ultimate authority of, their parents until the late teen years, after which they are
expected to function independent of parental control.118  Even in communities where
children are expected to grow up to assume roles and values identical to those of their
parents, children must go through a process of internalization,119 of assuming values as
their own, that will make such role fulfillment possible.  To assist with this
developmental shift, adolescents turn from their parents to their peers.
This is not to say that parents loose all influence over their children’s identity
choices.  Far from it.  Many studies suggest that parents typically exercise more influence
than peers over many of their adolescent’s most important, long-term decisions,120
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including religious choices,121 particularly where the parent-child relationship is
perceived by the adolescent to be close and supportive.122  The intensity of the parent’s
religious practice,123 and the strength of the parent’s religious group affiliation124  have
also been found to correlate positively with the transmission of religious values to
adolescent children.
While parents maintain a strong influence over the content of children’s identity
choices, it is through peer interactions that much of the identity formation work is done.
How the process unfolds, and how the choice-making is perceived by the adolescent, will
therefore have much to do with the identity of those peers and the nature of the
interactions.  After considering the role peers play in facilitating identity formation,
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generally, I will take a closer look at how that process might be affected by the choice of
peers.
b.  The Role of Peers
One of the most important changes that occurs in adolescence is the shift in
relational focus from parents to peers.  It is with peers that adolescents spend an
increasing portion of their time125 and share confidences,126 and it is through these peer
interactions that much of their identity development occurs.127
Peer interaction facilitates the development of individual identity on social,
cognitive, and emotional dimensions:  Most obviously, our very social choice of friends
helps define who we are in a way that our involuntary association with our parents
cannot.  Who we choose as friends tells our broader social group something about our
values, talents and tastes,128 and how we are perceived by others affects how they relate to
us. These interactions, in turn, affect how we perceive ourselves.129  Moreover, in the
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self with the perceptions of others.  Identity, Youth and Crisis, supra note.
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process of choosing friends, we learn something about what we enjoy and value.130
Disappointments in friendship may tell us as much about ourselves as about the erstwhile
friend.
As a matter of cognition, peer interactions facilitate the adolescent’s ability to
engage in self-reflection about her own identity.  Because peer interactions are perceived
as interactions among equals, they allow an adolescent to objectify her experiences,
behaviors, values and attitudes in a way that her interactions with her parents do not. 131
An adolescent can explore her own identity by talking to a peer about her experiences,
behaviors and values, and by comparing herself (along these dimensions) to that peer.132
In this way, adolescents use their relationships with peers to scrutinize themselves, and
this peer-facilitated objectification eventually evolves into a more internalized ability to
self-reflect.133
And finally, forming close relationships with peers provides a kind of emotional
support that helps adolescents make the transition from parental dependence to
autonomous action.134 Adolescents practice separating from their parents by attaching
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more intensely to peers, from which relationships they can gradually distance themselves
as they become increasingly comfortable with their independence.  Peers offer
transitional support, in part by simply offering the opportunity for close relationships
with those other than parents,135 and in part by reacting less personally, and therefore less
judgmentally than parents, to an exploration of options viewed as departures from
parental wishes.
Note that all three of these forms of peer influence bear primarily on the process
of identity formation, rather than to the substance of choices made by the adolescent.
Although direct peer influence over important choices is greatly feared by parents and the
public at large, this fear appears to be exaggerated.  As already mentioned, studies
suggest that adolescents are more influenced by parents than peers in the making of
important, far-reaching choices,136 and to the extent adolescents take direction from their
peers, that direction tends to be limited in its scope and duration.137  Finally, whatever
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influence peers exert over these choices is at least as likely to have pro-social as anti-
social effects.138
Far more important than this direct influence over substantive choices (“I will do
x because my peers do so or want me to do so”) is their influence over the process
through which an adolescent makes choices (“I will do x because of what I have decided
about myself, as a result of my interactions with my peers”).  This process influence is
also a matter of great concern to parents, for it, too, can inspire a departure from parental
values, albeit more indirectly.  This threat is likely to increase with the diversity of the
peer group, not because unlike peers will simply inspire an adolescent to follow along,
but rather because they may inspire, through the social, cognitive, and emotional effects
mentioned, a broader process of exploration that produces deeper questioning of values
inherited from parents and more careful consideration of how those values fit with the
adolescent’s emerging sense of self.  Whether the State has some countervailing interest
in promoting precisely this process of exploration is the important question unaddressed
by the courts.
i.  Which Peers?
The parents in our cases are not seeking to prevent peer interactions from
occurring altogether—a parenting practice that courts might well find abusive or
neglectful—but rather to control the nature, extent and composition of those peer
interactions.  In this way, a parent seeks to put the child’s peer interactions in service of
reinforcing sameness.  Where a parent limits the pool of peers to those raised in the
parents’ own traditions, the child’s choice of peers, the self-reflection facilitated by peers,
and the emotional support provided by peers in that pool will all help to point the child in
the direction of the parent’s religious community. 139
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While these relationships will still offer the child an opportunity to “try on” an
identity by acting independent of parents and reflecting on that identity through peer
interactions, this opportunity for exploration will be more narrowly circumscribed.  The
child’s choice of friendships may offer some range in personality types, but not in value
structures or long-term ambitions.  The child’s conversations with friends may allow her
to understand her own value structure better, but they will not push her to question her
own choices by comparing her values and plans with any others.  The emotional support
provided by these similar peers will help her make the transition to independence, but, at
least typically, would not extend to support a serious questioning of the common values
of the community.
Although most would consider a child’s embrace of her parent’s religious faith a
valuable, at least a neutral, end for the child,140 we should consider whether our valuation
of that end might be tied to how it was achieved, and what it reflects about the child’s
sense of self and the commitments she makes.  Returning to Erikson and Marcia, we
might worry about a “foreclosed” individual, whose sense of religious identity was an
unthinking adoption of parental beliefs, driven by a desire to please, or to avoid
disapproval.  As discussed above, some of the literature suggests that this path to
religious commitment may produce less healthy adult functioning.141  Even without
getting into the soft world of well-being indicators, we might worry that such a basis for
belief is inconsistent with the conception of autonomous choice that undergirds common
conceptions of what it means to exercise civil rights.  In contrast, we might expect that
facilitating an adolescent’s interaction with a wider range of peers might produce a more
thorough exploration of her identity which, in turn could produce the critical reflection
about values, practices and beliefs and the greater awareness of personal preferences
associated with more autonomous decision making.142
Not surprisingly, in the context of religious development, there is no direct proof
that increased interaction with unlike peers produces more autonomous choice making.
This is in part due to the fact that the law has protected parents’ right to shield their
children from this exposure.  It is also in part because, unless counteracted by the State,
self-selection in communities and in high school friendships143 tends to reduce the
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opportunities for peer interactions among religiously diverse individuals.  There is,
however, ample evidence of the more general connection between the opportunity for
exploration and greater independence in choice making and of the important role played
by peers in the exploration process, particularly when those peers are different from the
adolescent engaged in the exploration.  There is also support in analogous contexts for
the proposition that structured interaction with unlike peers has significant affects, not
only on perceptions of others, but also on perceptions of self.144
The litigating parents fear that facilitating these interactions will undermine their
ability to foster the child’s sense of affiliation and commitment to the parent’s religious
community.  To the extent the trade-off is inevitable, a consideration of adolescent
identity development suggests that the real choice courts are called upon to make is
between the State’s interest in facilitating a child’s more thorough, reflective, identity
exploration, on the one hand, and the parent’s interest in cultivating the child’s
connection with their own religious community and world view, on the other.  In the next
Part, I suggest that, at a minimum, the courts have an obligation to confront this trade-off
in their free exercise analysis.  I then go on to suggest an approach, grounded in the
developmental empirics, that could minimize the trade-off.
III.  Implications
Focusing on adolescent development does not suggest simple answers, but it does
significantly reframe the question.  This focus reveals that a primary developmental
project of adolescence is the working out of identity issues, and that a primary
developmental process employed in adolescence is peer interaction.  Because identity
formation is such an important preparatory step toward adulthood,145 and because peers
play such an important role in assisting adolescents to take the step, those with the
responsibility for children’s development—State and parent alike—have every reason to
be concerned about who those peers are, and the nature of those interactions.
The parents are well attuned to these concerns.  Indeed, their attempt to control
these peer interactions drives much of the litigation discussed in this article.  Controlling
these interactions, they have concluded, is a key piece of controlling the development of
their children’s group identification, spiritual beliefs, and value system.  Although the
courts acknowledge the parents’ concern, they fail to recognize any countervailing state
interest in exerting control over a child’s peer environment.  Instead, the courts focus
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woodenly on the State’s interest in the substance of the curriculum—pondering the
importance of teaching children information and methods of thinking abstracted from any
consideration of the company in whom these lessons are learned.  As a result of this
omission, courts undersell the State’s interest in keeping children together in school and
oversell the value of curricular control over both those who leave the public system for
private and home schools, and those who remain in the public system.
In my attempt to take better account of these values, let me begin by reviewing
the nature of the State’s interest in facilitating unlike peer interactions that is highlighted
by the developmental literature.  The message from this literature is not that peers will
constitute the primary influence over which choices an adolescent ultimately makes,
especially on issues of long-term importance.  Studies suggests that parents have more
outcome influence than peers on these important choices.146  The peer influence is more
subtle: Interaction with peers affects the process by which choices are made and this, in
turn, influences the adolescent’s attitudes about those choices and how they fit with the
adolescent’s evolving subjective sense of self.  By facilitating unlike peer interactions,
the State can stimulate adolescents’ engagement in a process of identity exploration that
can yield benefits for these adolescents, regardless of the ultimate identity choices they
make.
Consider the example of an Amish adolescent who embraces her family’s religion
as her own.  She might reach this point through a process of exploration and resolution
(producing, in Marcia’s words, an “achieved” identity status) or she might reach this
point through an unreflective fulfillment of expectations (producing “foreclosure”).147
Both processes can produce Amish adults, but those two adults will perceive of their
choice to remain Amish differently, and those differences will, in turn, affect their
perception of themselves and of the values adopted.  To oversimplify for the purpose of
clarity, a developmentalist would predict that an “achieved” Amish person would have a
real understanding of the opportunity to exit, would nevertheless choose not to exit, and
would appreciate why she made that choice and how it fits with the rest of her sense of
self, whereas a “foreclosed” Amish person would have no real understanding of what it
would mean to exercise other options, and would feel compelled by various social forces
to stay Amish, regardless of the fit.148
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 Of course, a process that makes the prospect of exit meaningful is also a process that makes exit more
likely, but for many, exposure to the process of exploration produces a changed perception of one’s
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The State might wish to promote identity achievement for two interrelated
reasons.  First, there is considerable support for the Eriksonian equation of identity
achievement with psychological health and successful adult functioning.149  A State
interested in maximizing the self-sufficiency of its adult citizenry--frequently identified
as a compelling state interest,150--might well seek to promote a process of choice making
that correlates with such positive mental health outcomes.  I am unwilling to argue,
however, that a State’s interest in facilitating adolescents’ identity exploration should be
grounded on these well-being indicators.  There is some evidence to suggest that a
foreclosed identity status can be highly adaptive in cultures which offer individuals few
options, and this pragmatic qualification supports a more principled reluctance to
embrace well-being indicators that cannot be easily disentangled from qualitative
judgments about the merits of various religious practices and beliefs.  In the absence of
more unequivocal data suggesting a marked difference in the quality of basic functioning
between individuals with achieved and foreclosed identity statuses across cultures, I
would not favor tying the State’s interest in facilitating exploration and identity
achievement to these well-being indicators.
The same literature, however, suggests another reason a State might wish to
promote identity achievement, a reason tied to the State’s interest in promoting
democratic participation, which is also frequently identified as compelling.151  The
literature suggests that identity exploration tends to produce a greater sense of autonomy
in subsequent decision making.  That is, those who make commitments after engaging in
a process of identity exploration are more likely to experience choice making as a
deliberate, self-reflective, selection among options and are more likely to perceive
themselves as the authors of their own choices.152  The identity development literature
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frequently equates this sense of autonomy with emotional and functional well-being,153
but the State need not rely on such outcome measures to justify its interest in nurturing a
sense of autonomy among adolescents.  The State might seek to cultivate this sense of
self-determination in its citizens, regardless of effects on well-being, in order to promote
their effective democratic participation both as voters and, more indirectly, through their
exercise of civil rights.
Whether self-reflective choice making is important to the functioning of our
democracy is, itself, of course, a question.  Classic liberal theory clearly assigns
autonomy a central role,154 and even political liberalism, which attempts to define a
common political core that does not demand the embrace of autonomy by all citizens,
nevertheless makes important assumptions about citizen’s capacity to engage in
autonomous decision making.155  Our cases, too, capture a concept of rights that appears
to associate their exercise with autonomous action.156  Indeed, a classic justification for
the circumscription of children’s rights is their reduced capacity to engage in autonomous
decision making.157  If our expectations for citizens’ political participation and exercise of
civil rights are grounded in assumptions about citizens’ capacity to act autonomously, as
many suggest they are, encouraging identity exploration through unlike peer interactions
offers a promising means of fulfilling these expectations.
Promoting the development of children’s capacity for autonomy is easy to
embrace in the abstract.  Courts might nevertheless conclude that this goal is
insufficiently compelling to justify constraining parents’ control over their children’s
associations, particularly where those associational choices are driven by religious
beliefs.  Because courts are likely to consider parental control of peer influence an
important means of transmitting religious values to their children, courts will be loathe to
                                                                     
Orientations and Mental Health, 65 J. of Personality and Social Psychology 586, 594 (1993)
(characterizing as autonomous action that action which is perceived by the actor as volitional and
“emanating from himself or herself”).
153
 See Wim Meeus and Maja Dekovie, Identity Development, Parental and Peer Support in Adolescence:
Results of a National Dutch Survey, 30 Adolescence 931, 932 (1995) (summarizing literature associating
identity achievement and moratorium with positive characteristics including autonomy).  This same
correlation between sense of self-efficacy and well-being is also noted in the separate psychological
literature of “attribution.”  See, e.g., Virginia C. Crandall & Beth W. Crandall, Maternal and Childhood
Behaviors as Antecedents of Internal-External Control Perceptions in Young Adulthood, in 2 Research with
the Locus of Control Construct 53, 53-54 (Herbert M. Lefcourt ed., 1983) (summarizing literature
suggesting that an “internalized locus of control” facilitates positive functioning in learning, achievement,
interpersonal skills, emotional adjustment, and contentment).
154
 See, supra.
155
 See, supra
156
 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (describing the State’s interest in protecting
the welfare of children as “the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be …
given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens”).
157
 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Steward, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child … is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees”); cf. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1978) (pointing to children’s “inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,” as one of three justifications for refusing to equate their
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diminish that control by requiring the parent to share peer control with the State.158  The
courts’ analysis does not, however, reflect any considered choice between conflicting
interests in peer control.  Instead, the court fails to take any account at all of the State’s
interest in facilitating interactions with unlike peers.
The omission is particularly remarkable, in light of the courts’ willingness to
recognize this interest in other contexts, particularly the context of state attempts to
restrict students’ religious proselytizing.159  In that context, the courts have emphasized
the benefit high school students in particular can derive from interactions that force them
to engage with students with whom they are likely to disagree.  In the words of one court:
Most importantly, the mission of public education is preparation for
citizenship.  High school students … must develop the ability to
understand and comment on the society in which they live and to develop
their own sets of values and beliefs.  A school policy completely
preventing students from engaging other students in open discourse on
issues they deem important cripples them as contributing citizens.  Such
restrictions do not advance any legitimate governmental interest.  On the
contrary, such inhibitions on individual development defeat the very
purpose of public education in secondary schools.160
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The decisions in these cases carry two strong messages that bear noting in our
consideration of parents’ attempts to block their children’s exposure to all or part of the
State’s educational offerings:  First, interaction among peers with different viewpoints is
valuable for children’s development into effective adult citizens, and, second, that value
increases with children’s age, particularly as they near adulthood.161
In the context of student proselytizing, the educational interest in facilitating
interactions with unlike peers is counterbalanced by the school’s interest in maintaining
order and avoiding the erroneous attribution of student viewpoints to the school.162  In our
context, in contrast, the counterweight may well be heavier.  If a trade-off between the
State’s interest in developing children’s capacities for independent choice making, on the
one hand, and parents’ interest in transmitting their religious values to their children, on
the other, is inevitable, we might well choose to protect parents’ interests over those of
the State.  With this much potentially at stake, however, it is incumbent upon the courts
to at least own up to the choice they are making, a choice between two aspects of our free
exercise conception which are generally assumed to be mutually compatible rather than
in conflict for protection under the free exercise clause.  It is a choice between a
conception of the free exercise clause that best facilitates a child’s ability to grow up and
make independent decisions on matters of religion, and a conception of the clause that
best facilitates a child’s sense of affiliation that would motivate her to assert the right.
One interpretation bolsters the child’s chance to choose at the possible cost of a depletion
of her religious connection, the other bolsters the chance of religious connection, at the
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cost of some opportunity for personal reflection.  Where the courts choose to privilege
religious connection over the facilitation of autonomous choice making, this preference
should be made plain in their decisions.
But the developmental literature offers more, I think, than a better understanding
of which interests are facilitated through which means.  It also suggests a way to
minimize the trade-off between the two important interests—the interest in developing
children’s capacity to exercise autonomous choice and the interest in transmitting a
parent’s religious values and affiliations to her child—that we have considered.  The
literature provides a more sophisticated account of the means as well as the timing of a
child’s development bearing on these two interests and this account, in turn, suggests a
means of enhancing both.
In the context of our cases, the law treats childhood as monolithic and for the
most part only accounts for development by distinguishing childhood from adulthood.
When all of childhood is treated as the same, trade-offs among developmental influences
will inevitably be perceived as abundant, for anything that influences a child is likely to
be in direct competition with every other influence.  Of course we know, without resort to
the literature, that development is ongoing through childhood, and that influences change
over the course of that development.  Indeed, influences can build on one another rather
than clash, and some influences occur early in life, and exert long-lasting effects, despite
a child’s lack of ongoing exposure to that influence.
There is no particular reason to think that the influences over a child’s
development of a sense of group identity and spiritual values are in direct competition
with those influences over a child’s development of a capacity for autonomous decision
making, despite the fact that both sets of influences may be felt by a child sometime in
adolescence.  Indeed, I find considerable support in the literature for the conclusion that
differences in the source and timing of these influences suggests that a child could get the
benefit of both types of influences if these influences are allowed to be temporally
disaggregated.
I have noted that the literature suggests that the primary source of a child’s values,
especially important values affecting long-term choices and group affiliations, is the
child’s parents.  Peers play a considerably larger role, however, in an adolescent’s
process of internalizing those value choices as the adolescent shifts from a conception of
parental authority to one of personal independence.  I also noted evidence suggesting that
group identity formation is well advanced by middle adolescence,163 whereas the more
self-focused, value-selecting aspect of identity work tends to occur later in adolescence
and even into early adulthood.  Together, differences in the source and timing of the two
sets of influences suggest that an age-sensitive approach to the balancing of state and
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parental interests might yield a result that better serves both interests: The law’s absolute
deference to parental control of a child’s associations could be modified in late
adolescence to account for the state’s distinct interests in exerting some associational
control during those years.
While the cases on which we are focusing make no intra-childhood age
distinctions, we have seen, in the cases considering student proselytizing activity, the
courts’ greater willingness to make age-based distinctions about the appropriateness of
unlike peer interactions.  Indeed, in that context, courts are willing to show less deference
to parents’ desire to protect their children from unlike peer interactions as those children
mature.  These cases reflect a greater level of attention to children’s changing needs and
roles, noting a decreased vulnerability to confusion or trauma associated with ideological
discussions among peers and an increased value of these interactions as these children
approach adulthood.
A strong developmental case can be made for the proposition that the State’s
interest in facilitating unlike peer interactions—particularly along the axis of religion
where parents are most concerned about securing associational likeness--is greatest when
minors reach late adolescence, and that this waxing of the state interest is accompanied
by the waning of the parental interest in blocking those interactions.  In doctrinal terms,
the burden on the parent’s religious exercise can be said to be reduced when her child
reaches late adolescence, because she has had sufficient opportunity to transmit her
religious values and affiliations to her child, and the threat to successful value
transmission  that can come at this stage from interaction with peers who do not share
those values and affiliations is relatively minor.  Conversely, the State’s interest in
preparing children for independent choice making (whether that interest is limited to the
political realm, or defined to include choice making in all aspects of life164) is at an all-
time high, because they will soon be called upon to make these choices.  Moreover, the
means of achieving this interest, namely the provision of opportunities for unlike peer
interactions, is particularly suited for late adolescence, when children rely on these
interactions to hash out their sense of identity.
Before going on to consider how this disaggregation of developmental influences
might be accomplished, I want to insert two qualifications to my endorsement of this
approach:  First, I note that my contention that these influences can be disaggregated is
necessarily speculative.  This is in part because developmentalists have never seen a
reason to frame the question in these terms and in part because the law has never given
them a good opportunity to study the question.  As long as the law rests associational
control in the hands of parents, alone, the harms and benefits of doing otherwise cannot
be tested.165  I therefore build my argument from what is known about child development
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43
to the unknown, in the hope that this informed speculation will push lawmakers to
reconsider their assumption that the trade-off is inevitable, and developmentalists to
develop a better understanding that will help them do so.
Second, I want to emphasize that my message is not one of absolutes.  I am not
suggesting that the opportunity to engage in identity exploration and to develop the
capacity for autonomous decision making is an all-or-nothing proposition either
facilitated or precluded depending upon whether an adolescent interacts with sufficiently
unlike peers.  Instead, I argue that adolescents’ interactions with peers who hold different
values and engage in different practices is one important piece of a child’s identity
formation process that will help push her in the direction of autonomous decision making.
Interactions with unlike peers will no more single-handedly guarantee the development of
this capacity than the reading of Shakespeare will guarantee the development of creativity
or greater wisdom about the ways of the world.  I have kept things simple to make the
point that the facilitating of unlike peer interactions, like the teaching of great poetry,
adds something important to a child’s education.
One example of this oversimplification for the sake of clarity worth special
mention is my use of the term “unlike.”  Of course, peers can be like and unlike one
another in an infinite number of ways, and I am not attempting to capture a quantifiable
degree of difference along particular characteristics, but rather to describe the range of
peers that a parent wishes to exclude from her child’s social world on grounds of
ideological unlikeness.  The fact that like and unlike are not absolute concepts would
make the State’s job more complicated in execution, but it need not obscure the goal,
which is to facilitate interaction among peers with a broad range of viewpoints and
experiences bearing on matters of importance.
Assuming that I am right in contending that the parent’s interest in religious value
transmission and the State’s interest in facilitating autonomous decision making can both
be served by reserving the State’s associational control until late adolescence, there are
various ways the influence split could be put into effect.   At one extreme, the State could
eliminate all exemptions from school attendance requirements, even compel public
school attendance or some other form of associational activity with unlike peers, in the
last one or two years of minority.  Such compulsory public education might be applied
universally, or, perhaps, as a form of compensatory education for children, such as those
who had been home schooled, whose peer exposure had been most dramatically
circumscribed.  The diminution of parental burdens, and the enhancement of the State’s
interest in these last years provide a basis for limiting the application of the holdings in
both Pierce and Yoder to children under 16 or 17.166
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Limiting parents’ control over their children in late adolescence is not, itself, a
radical move.  The law shifts control over a number of important decisions to minors over
the course of adolescence.167  Moreover, the shift of control from parent to State
suggested here is relatively minor: Up until 16 or 17, parents would have the full level of
educational control protected in Pierce and Yoder, and even after this age parents would
still have legal authority over all other aspects of the child’s religious upbringing.  The
State could compel a kind of compensatory education to make up for the restrictions
placed on peer interactions, but it would otherwise be required to defer to parental
decision making.  Indeed, as I argue below, parents could have broad authority to exempt
their children from particular curricular content, so long as those exemptions did not
interfere with the State’s ability to facilitate the profitable peer interactions.
Such an approach, however, while legally justifiable, might come at too great a
cost—in educational disruption accompanying school shifts in the middle of high school,
in costs associated with transporting children long distances to secure a sufficiently
diverse student body, and in the symbolic effects associated with forcing parental
compliance with educational programs they found so objectionable.  In addition,
compelling attendance could interfere with minor’s exercise of their own educational
choices, choices the State’s attendance requirements were designed to promote.  Less
drastically, the State could encourage the desired peer interactions by eliminating
supports, such as vouchers, for segregated alternatives in the late teenage years, or by
subsidizing the pursuit of integrative interaction by individuals or institutions through tax
benefits or other means.
As noted, the State might also make the peer integration in public schools more
attractive by affording parents more authority to make curriculum-specific adjustments.
Fundamentalist parents such as those in Mozert are more likely to keep their children in
the public school setting where they have an opportunity to interact with unlike peers, if
they can exercise some control over the content of some of those interactions.168  The
excusal itself might also facilitate valuable interactions among peers, if handled
appropriately, for allowing such excusals could draw students’ attention to the fact that
some of their peers’ families found the materials they were studying objectionable.
Finally, home-schooled children could get the benefit of some interaction with unlike
peers if they were allowed to attend public school part time, or at least participate in after
school activities, such as sports.169
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Of course, it will not be enough for the State to require or support public school
attendance if families can select for religious homogeneity in their communities, and
students can select for homogeneity in their choice of peer interactions.170  On both scores
we can learn a great deal by looking to the history of the schools’ attempts to integrate
their educational programs along racial lines.  White parents were able to prevent their
children from interacting with African American children by simply moving out of the
racially integrated areas or by sending their children to racially segregated private
schools, and attempts to thwart such actions by restructuring school authority and busing
children long distances met with serious practical, political and legal resistance.
Similarly, within a school attended by both African American and white students,
segregation often continues, both because academic systems of tracking minimize class
contact, and because students’ selection of friends and larger social groupings reinforce
the separation.
Policy makers are still struggling to find more successful ways of bringing
students together across racial lines in the public schools and to ensure meaningful
interaction among these racially unlike peers.171  The fact that securing the goal of racial
integration has proved difficult, however, has not altered the view of courts that the goal
is an important one.  Unless we determine that integration, even in the late teenage years,
is not an appropriate goal in our context (a view I rely on the developmental literature to
dispute) then the focus shifts from the whether to the how.
Conclusion
At the most basic level, the State’s interest, like a parent’s, is in preparing the
child for a successful adulthood—successful in the eyes of society, the parent and the
(erstwhile) child.  Success will surely include the ability to engage in an occupation or
otherwise be self-supporting as well as the orderly and responsible participation in public
activities including the democratic process.  Many theorists suggest that success should
also be defined to include the exercise of independent judgment in the making of
decisions, a goal largely unaddressed in this context by the courts. Like the courts,
however, the theorists shy away from giving the State any authority over the peer
associations that are likely to facilitate the development of that decision-making capacity.
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Driven, in my view, by an unsupported fear that interference with a parent’s associational
control of her child at any age will seriously interfere with her ability to transmit her
religious values and affiliations to the child, courts and theorists, alike, avoid any
consideration of what benefit the State can confer upon children by providing them with
an opportunity to interact with unlike peers.
While the developmental literature hardly holds all the answers, it offers a
response to this fear on two levels.  First, it suggests that, whatever threat is posed to
parental control by children’s exposure to unlike peers comes with considerable
compensating developmental benefits to the individual child, and, second, it suggests a
possible means of achieving these benefits at minimal cost to the parent’s control over the
transmission of religious values.  The developmental literature does not, of course, come
with guarantees.  It does, however, suggest that courts and theorists alike have missed a
big piece of children’s developmental experience, which, when taken into account,
demands a fresh look at how we strike the balance between parent and State in the battle
over educational control.
